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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KELLY LAFE GARNER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20010462-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for four counts of 
burglary, all third degree felonies (R. 94-95). This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f)(Supp. 2001) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
If this Court chooses to consider the merits of defendant's 
inadequately articulated and briefed claim, the issue is: 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
dismiss on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial was not violated by the passage of 14 months between the 
State's filing of an information against defendant and its 
subsequent filing of a detainer? 
x%x
 [T] he propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or 
1 
deny a motion to dismiss is a question of law that we review for 
correctness.'" State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 60, |6, 975 P.2d 
505 (quoting Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 
1996)) (alteration in original) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial. . . . " 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The chronology of events pertinent to this appeal is as 
follows: 
Nov. 1997 - March 1998 
May 1998 
June 1998-August 1999 
May 1999 
June 14, 1999 
November 1999 
Offenses at issue are committed (R. 
1-10; R. 106 at addendum A) 
State's witness makes written 
statement implicating defendant (R. 
106); defendant, incarcerated in 
Davis County, agrees to talk to 
investigators upon release from 
jail, but instead flees the 
jurisdiction (R. 107) 
Defendant incarcerated in Colorado 
(R. 107) 
Defendant's mother dies (R. 107; R. 
113, tab 4, p. 12) 
Information filed (R. 1-10) 
Defendant transported to Alabama 
State Prison for parole violation 
(R. 107-08) 
Mid-July - Aug. 3, 2000 Utah lodges detainer (R. 108) 
January 4, 2001 Arraignment; Defendant waives 
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January 29, 2001 
February 22, 2 001 
March 22, 2001 
April 19, 2001 
May 14, 2001 
May 31, 2001 
July 11, 2001 
preliminary hearing and enters plea 
of not guilty (R. 36-40) 
Motion to Suppress/Dismiss filed; 
defendant raises speedy trial issue 
(R. 48-52) 
Motion hearing; defendant argues 
his due process rights violated by 
pre-filing delay; his speedy trial 
right denied by delay between 
filing of information and placing 
of detainer (R. 113, tab 4, pp. 1-
4) . 
Motion to Dismiss denied (R. 73-74) 
Defendant enters guilty plea to 
four counts of burglary, reserving 
right to appeal speedy trial issue 
(R. 91-92; R. 113, tab 7, p. 2-3) 
Minute Order: Judgment, Sentence, 
Commitment to Utah State Prison, 0-
5 years, concurrent with an Alabama 
sentence currently being served; 
$10,840 in restitution, collectable 
after completion of Alabama 
parole/probation (R. 94-96) 
Notice of appeal filed (R. 101) 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order denying Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 106-09 or addendum A) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of the offense of burglary are not pertinent to 
the resolution of this case, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the outset, this Court may choose not to consider 
defendant's claim because it is both inadequately presented and 
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argued. Even on the merits, however, defendant's constitutional 
right to a speedy trial, when evaluated pursuant to the four-
prong balancing test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972), was not violated by the passage of 14 months between the 
filing of the information and the lodging of the detainer. 
Although the length of the delay triggers further analysis, the 
delay was not intentional on the State's part, defendant did not 
assert his right until nearly five months after the detainer had 
been lodged and, most importantly, defendant has wholly failed to 
establish any prejudice arising from the delay. Consequently, 
his claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ADEQUATELY 
ARTICULATED OR BRIEFED HIS SPEEDY 
TRIAL CLAIM; IN ANY EVENT, SUCH AN 
ARGUMENT WOULD FAIL UNDER THE FOUR-
PART BALANCING TEST ARTICULATED IN 
BARKER V. WINGO, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972) 
In the trial court, defendant moved for dismissal, arguing 
that the State's delay in filing charges against him violated his 
right.to due process and that the passage of time between the 
State's filing of the information and its placement of the 
detainer violated his right to a speedy trial (R. 113, tab 4, pp. 
2-4). The trial court rejected these claims, focusing its 
written ruling largely on the speedy trial issue (R. 106-09 at 
addendum A). 
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On appeal, defendant's argument is unclear. Nowhere does he 
articulate the distinction he asserted in the trial court between 
pre-filing delay as a due process violation and post-filing delay 
as a speedy trial violation. To the contrary, he seems to merge 
the due process and speedy trial arguments, focusing primarily on 
the pre-filing delay and secondarily on the post-filing delay, 
but framing both in the rubric of speedy trial violations. 
See Br. of App. at 13-14. 
In addition to the lack of clarity in articulating the 
parameters of his argument, defendant's legal analysis is 
inadequate. While he discusses a United States Supreme Court 
case at some length and cites to several Utah cases, his brief 
contains but a single page of argumentation, which does little to 
clarify how the law applies to the facts of his case. See Br. of 
App. at 13. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should decline to even 
consider his claim. Pursuant to rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, a reviewing court is "entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited," and is 
not "simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump 
the burden of argument and research." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 
1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). This Court has consistently declined to 
address issues not adequately briefed under rule 24. See, e.g., 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
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Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 
1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) . 
Even if this Court were to address defendant's claims, they 
would fail. 
Defendant first argues that the delay of 13 months between 
the time the State obtained a witness statement implicating him 
in the crimes at issue and the time the State filed the 
information violated his speedy trial right (Br. of App. at 13) * 
This claim fails at the outset because until a defendant has been 
formally accused, either by the filing of an information or an 
indictment, the right to a speedy trial is not implicated.1 
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992)(identifying 
"the interval between accusation and trial" as the critical 
period in which delay may trigger a speedy trial analysis). 
Defendant also argues that the delay between the State's 
filing of the information and its filing of a detainer some 13 to 
14 months later violated his right to a speedy trial (Br. of App. 
at 13). This delay triggers the analysis set forth in Barker v. 
1
 Even if this claim had been argued on appeal as a due 
process violation, it would necessarily fail. The trial court 
found that investigators had sought to interview defendant in 
jail prior to charging him in this case (R. 107). Defendant 
agreed to be interviewed upon his release from jail but then 
immediately absconded from the jurisdiction (Id.). Having thus 
impeded the investigation, defendant cannot now claim that the 
length of delay caused by his own conduct violated his right to 
due process. See State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1990) 
(delay attributable to defendant, should not be assessed against 
the State). 
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Winao, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) and endorsed in Utah by State v. 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986). Pursuant to that 
analysis, a reviewing court balances the impact of four factors, 
the first of which is the length of the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 530; Banks, 720 P.2d at 1385. Generally, postaccusation delay 
of about a year, as in this case, will trigger further judicial 
review. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.l (citing 2 W. LaFave & J. 
Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2, p.1 405 (1984)). Certainly, 
when delay stretches beyond what is ordinary in the course of 
judicial proceedings, its prejudicial effect will intensify over 
time. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, In this case, the delay of just 
over a year, while not ordinary, was not extraordinary. 
The second factor examined by a reviewing court is the 
reason for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Barker teaches 
that "different weights should be assigned to different reasons," 
with intentional delays held against the State. Id. Negligence, 
on the other hand, is *[a] more neutral reason" and "should be 
weighted less heavily." Id. In this case, the State conceded at 
trial that the delay between June of 1999, when the information 
was filed, and August of 2000, when the detainer was lodged "is 
simply negligence, dereliction, whatever. I don't have an 
explanation" (R. 113, tab 4, p. 9). 
Third, a reviewing court looks at whether and how a 
defendant asserts his right to a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. 
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at 531. In this case, defendant waited almost six months after 
Utah lodged its detainer in Alabama before he filed his motion to 
dismiss asserting his right to a speedy trial (R. 48-52) . 
The fourth factor is prejudice to defendant resulting from 
the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Defendant contends that he 
was actually prejudiced by the delay between the time Utah filed 
charges against him and the time it filed a detainer, pointing 
specifically to Alabama's refusal to consider him for parole once 
it realized that Utah had an interest in him (Br. of App. at 
13) .2 This claim fails because no record evidence supports this 
factual allegation.3 
2
 Under the rubric of speedy trial, defendant also argues 
that his mother would have provided an alibi for him and that, 
consequently, he was actually prejudiced by her death during the 
pre-filing delay. See Br. of App. at 13. In the trial court, 
however, defendant's counsel stated, "I'm agreeing that the death 
of the mother does not affect the speedy trial argument. That 
was the due process argument. A speedy trial because, the right 
to a speedy trial does not apply to the information as filed so 
any prejudice that occurred prior to that time would not, would 
clearly not affect to whether or not the defendant was denied his 
right to a speedy trial [sic]. I'm agreeing with [the 
prosecutor] that the death of the mother does not apply to that 
argument" (R. 113, tab 4, p.18). Defendant plainly cannot argue 
on appeal precisely what he conceded below - that his mother's 
death, which occurred prior to the time he was charged, had any 
effect on a right that accrued only after he had been formally 
charged. State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, 1(21, 37 P.3d 1180. 
3
 Defendant argued in the trial court that he need not 
prove "actual prejudice" because a delay of more than 12 months 
created "presumptive prejudice." See R. 113, tab 4, pp. 4-5, 12-
15. On appeal, however, defendant has seemingly abandoned the 
presumptive prejudice argument, and focused wholly on what he 
perceives to be actual prejudice. See Br. of App. at 13-14. 
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In the trial court, defense counsel asserted that the State 
stipulated that defendant had suffered the "loss of parole date" 
based on the State's delay in filing a detainer (R. 113, tab 5, 
p. 3-4). The State responded, "I have not stipulated to that but 
I didn't have any reason to dispute that. . . . I don't have any 
reason to know otherwise, your Honor, that could very well be" 
(Id. at 4). In essence, the State simply said that it didn't 
have knowledge on the matter one way or the other. The trial 
court then directed counsel, " [Prosecutor,] you'll prepare the 
findings of fact and if you'll look at those, [defense counsel], 
and make sure that you have any facts that you want listed in 
that finding of facts so that's preserved" (Id.). Notably, the 
findings of fact before this Court on appeal are wholly silent on 
the issue of a parole date, whether defendant had one, or if it 
was denied. Without any record evidence, this Court cannot 
conclude that defendant suffered prejudice by failing to obtain 
parole in Alabama as a result of a delay between the filing of 
the information and the lodging of a detainer. State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982). 
9 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
four convictions for burglary, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this T day of March, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C; SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Maurice Richards, attorney for appellant, Public 
Defenders Association of Weber County, 2568 Washington Blvd., 
Suite 102, Ogden, Utah 84401, this _7__ day of March, 2002. 
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ADDENDUM A 
RICHARD A. PARMLEY LBN 2528 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KELLY L. GARNER 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. AND 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
Case No 991902255 
Judge Parley R Baldwin 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on the Defendant's motion to dismiss for 
denial of speedy trial and claimed violation of due process of law The Defendant was present and 
represented by Martin Gravis. The State was represented by Richard Parmley. The Court heard 
the arguments and took the matter under advisement until March 22, 2001, at which time the 
Court made an order from the bench denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss The Court 
issues these written findings of fact, conclusions of law and order consistent with that action 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The offenses with which the Defendant was charged occurred between November 
1997 and March 1998 
2. A key witness for the State made a written statement in May of 1998 identifying 
the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes This statement was further 
developed over a period of four to six months 
3 Defendant had been arrested in Davis County and was in the Davis County Jail 
from April of 1998 to May of 1998 
4 The Defendant knew of the investigation being conducted in Wreber County and 
had indicated a willingness to talk with investigators there upon his release from 
the Davis County Jail. 
5 Weber County investigators wanted to interview the suspect before a decision was 
made to charge him. 
6 When the Defendant was released from the jail he fled the jurisdiction while the 
Davis County matters remained unadjudicated. 
7. The Defendant never made contact with the Weber County investigators who were 
continuing to investigate the case through the remainder of 1998 and beginning of 
1999. 
8. In May of 1999, the Defendant's mother died and Defendant claims she would 
have offered pertinent alibi testimony in his defense. 
9. The Defendant was arrested for criminal trespass in Colorado in June of 1998 and 
remained incarcerated there until August of 1999 
10. The County Attorney's Office filed this case in June of 1999, approximately one 
year after Weber County had begun investigation. 
11. At the time the informations were filed, Weber County investigators had learned of 
the Defendant's incarceration in Colorado 
12. Weber County did not locate the Defendant's exact whereabouts in Colorado to 
lodge a detainer at that time. 
13 In November of 1999, the Defendant was transported to the .Alabama State Prison 
for a parole violation. 
14. The Defendant remained in the .Alabama prison until shonly after the State became 
aware of his whereabouts and lodged a detainer sometime between mid July and 
August 3, 2000. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The delay between the commission of the offenses and the filing of the charge in 
this case were not intentional on the part of the State to gain strategic advantage 
2. There were various reasonable explanations for the delay including a desire to talk 
with the defendant who had fled the jurisdiction and other efforts to bolster the 
evidence against the Defendant by obtaining statements from other witnesses 
3. The delay of one year between charging the Defendant and bringing him to trial is 
not alone sufficient to conclude a denial of a right to speedy trial but warrants 
consideration of the other factors set forth in Barker v. Wineo. 407 U.S. 514 
(1972) and State v Banks. 720 P 2d 1380 (Utah 1986) (reason for the delay. 
Defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the Defendant) 
4. In balancing these factors and the other circumstances contained in the findings of 
fact the Defendant has not been denied his right to a speedy trial 
ORDER 
The Court denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss 
DATED this ' day orameUOQ 1 
-,'vU.UM.' 
}arley R. Baldwin 
District Court Judge 
• ^ 
j 
^Prxpiaieci by ^ 
RJchard A. Parmley 
Approved as to form: 
V Gravis 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ANT) ORDER OF THE COL'RT was hand delivered or mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to: 
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Public Defender's Association, Inc , 
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